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Abstract. Verifying whether a procedure is observationally pure is use-
ful in many software engineering scenarios. An observationally pure pro-
cedure always returns the same value for the same argument, and thus
mimics a mathematical function. The problem is challenging when pro-
cedures use private mutable global variables, e.g., for memoization of
frequently returned answers, and when they involve recursion.
We present a novel verification approach for this problem. Our approach
involves encoding the procedure’s code as a formula that is a disjunction
of path constraints, with the recursive calls being replaced in the formula
with references to a mathematical function symbol. Then, a theorem
prover is invoked to check whether the formula that has been constructed
agrees with the function symbol referred to above in terms of input-
output behavior for all arguments.
We evaluate our approach on a set of realistic examples, using the Boogie
intermediate language and theorem prover. Our evaluation shows that
the invariants are easy to construct manually, and that our approach is
effective at verifying observationally pure procedures.
1 Introduction
A procedure in an imperative programming language is said to be observationally
pure (OP) if for each specific argument value it has a specific return value, across
all possible sequences of calls to the procedure, irrespective of what other code
runs between these calls. In other words, the input-output behavior of an OP
procedure mimics a mathematical function.
Any procedure whose code is deterministic and does not read any pre-existing
state other than its arguments is trivially OP. However, it is common for proce-
dures, especially ones in libraries, to update and read global variables, typically
to optimize their own behavior, while still mimicking mathematical functions in
terms of their input-output behavior. In this paper, we focus on the problem of
checking observational purity of procedures that read and write global variables,
especially in the presence of recursion, which makes the problem harder.
1.1 Motivating Example
We use the example procedure ‘factCache’ in Listing 1.1 as our running example.
It returns n! for the given argument n, and caches the return value for the last
12 int g := −1;
3 int l a stN := 0 ;
4 int factCache ( int n) {
5 i f (n <= 1) {
6 r e s u l t := 1 ;
7 } else i f ( g != −1 && n == lastN ) {
8 r e s u l t := g ;
9 } else {
10 g = n ∗ factCache ( n − 1 ) ;
11 l a stN = n ;
12 r e s u l t := g ;
13 }
14 return r e s u l t ;
15 }
Listing 1.1. Procedure factCache: returns n!, and memoizes most recent result.
argument provided to it. It uses two “private” global variables to implement
the caching – g, and lastN. g is initialized to -1, and after the first call to the
procedure onwards is used to store the return value from the most recent call.
lastN is used to store the argument received in the most recent call. Clearly this
procedure is OP, and mimics the input-output behavior of a regular factorial
procedure that does not cache any results.
1.2 Proposed Approach
Our verification approach is based on Floyd-Hoare logic. In order to verify a
recursive procedure inductively, typically a specification of the procedure would
need to be provided. The first idea for such a specification would be a full func-
tional specification of the procedure. That is, if someone specifies that factCache
mimics n!, then the verifier could replace Line 10 in the code with ‘g = n * (n-1)!’.
This, on paper, is sufficient to assert that Line 12 always assigns n! to ‘result’.
However, to establish that Line 8 also does the same, an invariant would need
to be provided that describes the possible values of g before any invocation to
the procedure. In our example, a suitable invariant would be ‘(g = -1) ∨ (g =
lastN!)’. The verifier would also need to verify that at the procedure’s exit the
invariant is re-established. Lines 10-12, with the recursive call replaced by (n-1)!,
suffices on paper to re-establish the invariant.
The candidate approach mentioned above, while being plausible, suffers from
two weaknesses. The first is that a human would need to guess the mathematical
expression that is implemented by the given procedure. This may not be easy
when the procedure is complex. Second, the underlying theorem prover would
need to prove complex arithmetic properties, e.g., that n * (n-1)! is equal to n!.
Complex proofs such as this may be out of bounds for many existing theorem
provers.
Our key insight is to sidestep the challenges mentioned by introducing a
function symbol, say factCache, and replacing the recursive call for the purposes
of verification with this function symbol. Intuitively, factCache represents the
mathematical function that the given procedure mimics if the procedure is OP.
In our example, Line 10 would become ‘g = n * factCache(n-1)’. This step needs
no human involvement. The approach needs an invariant; however, in a novel
manner, we allow the invariant also to refer to factCache. In our example, a
suitable invariant would be ‘(g = -1) ∨ (g = lastN * factCache(lastN-1))’. This
sort of invariant is relatively easy to construct; e.g., a human could arrive at it
just by looking at Line 2 and with a local reasoning on Lines 10 and 11. Given this
invariant, (a) a theorem prover could infer that the condition in Line 7 implies
that Line 8 necessarily copies the value of ‘n * factCache(n-1)’ into ‘result’. Due
to the transformation to Line 10 mentioned above, (b) the theorem prover can
infer that Line 12 also does the same. Note that since these two expressions are
syntactically identical, a theorem prover can easily establish that they are equal
in value. Finally, since Line 6 is reached under a different condition than Lines 8
and 12, the verifier has finished establishing that the procedure always returns
the same expression in n for any given value of n.
Similarly, using the modified Line 10 mentioned above and from Line 11, the
prover can re-establish that g is equal to ‘lastN * factCache(lastN - 1)’ when
control reaches Line 12. Hence, the necessary step of proving the given invariant
to be a valid invariant is also complete.
Note, the effectiveness of the approach depends on the nature of the given
invariant. For instance, if the given invariant was ‘(g = -1) ∨ (g = lastN!)’, which
is also technically correct, then the theorem prover may not be able to establish
that in Lines 8 and 12 the variable ‘g’ always stores the same expression in n.
However, it is our claim that in fact it is the invariant ‘(g = -1) ∨ (g = lastN *
factCache(lastN-1))’ that is easier to infer by a human or by a potential tool, as
justified by us two paragraphs above.
1.3 Salient Aspects Of Our Approach
This paper makes two significant contributions. First, it tackles the circularity
problem that arises due to the use of a presumed-to-be OP procedure in asser-
tions and invariants and the use of these invariants in proving the procedure
to be OP. This requires us to prove the soundness of an approach that verifies
observational purity as well the validity of invariants simultaneously (as they
cannot be decoupled).
Secondly, as we show, a direct approach to this verification problem (which
we call the existential approach) reduces it to a problem of verifying that a
logical formula is a tautology. The structure of the generated formula, however,
makes the resulting theorem prover instances hard. We show how a conservative
approximation can be used to convert this hard problem into an easier problem
of checking satisfiability of a quantifier-free formula, which is something within
the scope of state-of-the-art theorem provers.
The most closely related previous approaches are by Barnett et al. [1,2], and
by Naumann [3]. These approaches check observational purity of procedures that
maintain mutable global state. However, none of these approaches use a function
symbol in place of recursive calls or within invariants. Therefore, it is not clear
L ∈ Lib ::= g := c P
P ∈ Proc ::= p (x) { S; return y }
S ∈ Stmt ::= x := e | x := p(y) | S ; S | if (e) then S else S
e ∈ Expr ::= c | x | e op e | unop e
op ∈ Ops ::= + | - | / | * | % | > | < | == | ∧ | ∨
unop ∈ UnOps ::= ¬
x, y ∈ LocalId ∪ GlobalId, g ∈ GlobalId, c ∈ V, p ∈ ProcId
Fig. 1. Programming language syntax and meta-variables
that these approaches can verify recursive procedures. Barnett et al., in fact,
state “there is a circularity - it would take a delicate argument, and additional
conditions, to avoid unsoundness in this case”. To the best of our knowledge
ours is the first paper to show that it is feasible to check observational purity
of procedures that maintain mutable global state for optimization purposes and
that make use of recursion.
Being able to verify that a procedure is OP has many potential applications.
The most obvious one is that OP procedures can be memoized. That is, input-
output pairs can be recorded in a table, and calls to the procedure can be
elided whenever an argument is seen more than once. This would not change the
semantics of the overall program that calls the procedure, because the procedure
always returns the same value for the same argument (and mutates only private
global variables). Another application is that if a loop contains a call to an OP
procedure, then the loop can be parallelized (provided the procedure is modified
to access and update its private global variables in a single atomic operation).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the core
programming language that we address. Section 3 provides formal semantics
for our language, as well as definitions of invariants and observational purity.
Section 4 describes our approach formally. Section 5 discusses an approach for
generating an invariant automatically in certain cases. Section 6 describes eval-
uation of our approach on a few realistic examples. Section 7 describes related
work.
2 Language Syntax
In this paper, we assume that the input to the purity checker is a library con-
sisting of one or more procedures, with shared state consisting of one or more
variables that are private to the library. We refer to these variables as “global”
variables to indicate that they retain their values across multiple invocations of
the library procedures, but they cannot be accessed or modified by procedures
outside the library (that is, the clients of the library).
In Fig. 1, we present the syntax of a simple programming language that we
address in this paper. Given the foundational focus of this work, we keep the
programming language very simple, but the ideas we present can be generalized.
A return statement is required in each procedure, and is permitted only as
the last statement of the procedure. The language does not contain any looping
construct. Loops can be modelled as recursive procedures. The formal parameters
of a procedure are readonly and cannot be modified within the procedure. We
omit types from the language. We permit only variables of primitive types. In
particular, the language does not allow pointers or dynamic memory allocation.
Note that expressions are pure in this language, and a procedure call is not
allowed in an expression. Each procedure call is modelled as a separate statement.
For simplicity of presentation, without loss of conceptual generality, we as-
sume that the library consists of a single (possibly recursive) procedure, with a
single formal parameter. In the sequel, we will use the symbol p (as a metavari-
able) to represent this library procedure, p (as a metavariable) to represent the
name of this procedure, and will assume that the name of the formal parameter
is n. If the procedure is of the form “p (n) { S; return r }”, we refer to r
as the return variable, and refer to “S; return r” as the procedure body and
denote it as body(p). The library also contains, outside of the procedure’s code,
a sequence of initializing declarations of the global variables used in the proce-
dure, of the form “g1 := c1; . . .; gN := cN”. These initializations are assumed
to be performed once during any execution of the client application, just before
the first call to the procedure p is placed by the client application.
Finally, a note about terminology: throughout this paper we use the word
‘procedure’ to refer to the library procedure p, and use the word ‘function’ to
refer to a mathematical function.
3 A Semantic Definition of Purity
In this section, we formalize the input-output semantics of the procedure p as a
relation  p, where n  p r indicates that an invocation of p with input n may
return a result of r. The procedure is then defined to be observationally pure if
the relation  p is a (partial) function: that is, if n  p r1 and n  p r2, then
r1 = r2.
The object of our analysis is the set of procedures in the library, or, actually,
a single-procedure library (for simplicity of presentation), but not the entire
(client) application. The result of our analysis is valid for any client program
that uses the procedure/library. The only assumptions we make are: (a) The
shared state used by the library (the global variables) are private to the library
and cannot be modified by the rest of the program, and (b) The client invokes
the library procedures sequentially: no concurrent or overlapping invocations of
the library procedures by a concurrent client are permitted.
The following semantic formalism is motivated by the above observations. It
can be seen as the semantics of the so-called “most general sequential client”
of procedure p, which is the program: while (*) x = p (random()); . The
executions (of p) produced by this program include all possible executions (of
p) produced by all sequential clients.
LetG denote the set of global variables. Let L denote the set of local variables.
Let V denote the set of numeric values (that the variables can take). An element
ρg ∈ ΣG = G →֒ V maps global variables to their values. An element ρℓ ∈
ΣL = L →֒ V maps local variables to their values. We define a local continuation
to be a statement sequence ending with a return statement. We use a local
continuation to represent the part of the procedure body that still remains to
be executed. Let ΣC represent the set of local continuations. The set of runtime
states (or simply, states) is defined to be (ΣC × ΣL)
∗ × ΣG, where the first
component represents a runtime stack, and the second component the values of
global variables. We denote individual states using symbols σ, σ1, σi, etc. The
runtime stack is a sequence, each element of which is a pair (S, ρℓ) consisting
of the remaining procedure fragment S to be executed and the values of local
variables ρℓ. We write (S, ρℓ)γ to indicate a stack where the topmost entry is
(S, ρℓ) and γ represents the remaining part of the stack.
We say that a state ((S, ρℓ)γ, ρg) is an entry-state if its location is at the
procedure entry point (i.e., if S is the entire body of the procedure), and we
say that it is an exit-state if its location is at the procedure exit point (i.e., if S
consists of just a return statement).
A procedure p determines a single-step execution relation →p, where σ1 →p
σ2 indicates that execution proceeds from state σ1 to state σ2 in a single step.
Fig. 2 defines this semantics. The semantics of evaluation of a side-effect-free
expression is captured by a relation (ρ, e) ⇓ v, indicating that the expression e
evaluates to value v in an environment ρ (by environment, we mean an element
of ΣL × ΣG). We omit the definition of this relation, which is straightforward.
We use the notation ρ1 ⊎ ρ2 to denote the union of two disjoint maps ρ1 and ρ2.
Note that most rules captures the usual semantics of the language constructs.
The last two rules, however, capture the semantics of the most-general sequential
client explained previously: when the call stack is empty, a new invocation of
the procedure may be initiated (with an arbitrary parameter value).
Note that all the following definitions are parametric over a given procedure
p. E.g., we will use the word “execution” as shorthand for “execution of p”.
We define an execution (of p) to be a sequence of states σ0σ1 · · ·σn such that
σi →p σi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < n. Let σinit denote the initial state of the library; i.e.,
this is the element of ΣG that is induced by the sequence of initializing declara-
tions of the library, namely, “g1 := c1; . . .; gN := cN” We say that an execution
σ0σ1 · · ·σn is a feasible execution if σ0 = σinit. Note, intuitively, a feasible exe-
cution corresponds to the sequence of states visited within the library across all
invocations of the library procedure over the course of a single execution of the
most-general client mentioned above; also, since the most-general client supplies
a random parameter value to each invocation of p, in general multiple feasible
executions of the library may exist. We say that a state σ is reachable if there
exists an execution π = σinitσ1 · · ·σ.
We define a trace (of p) to be a substring π = σ0 · · ·σn of a feasible execution
such that: (a) σ0 is entry-state (b) σn is an exit-state, and (c) σn corresponds
to the return from the invocation represented by σ0. In other words, a trace is a
state sequence corresponding to a single invocation of the procedure. A trace may
contain within it nested sub-traces due to recursive calls, which are themselves
[assgn]
x ∈ L (ρℓ ⊎ ρg, e) ⇓ v
((x := e; S, ρℓ)γ, ρg)→p ((S, ρℓ[x 7→ v])γ, ρg)
[assgn]
x ∈ G (ρℓ ⊎ ρg, e) ⇓ v
((x := e; S, ρℓ)γ, ρg)→p ((S, ρℓ)γ, ρg[x 7→ v])
[seq]
(((S1; S2); S3, ρℓ)γ, ρg)→p ((S1; (S2; S3), ρℓ)γ, ρg)
[if-true]
(ρℓ ⊎ ρg, e) ⇓ true
(((if (e) then S1else S2); S3, ρℓ)γ, ρg)→p ((S1; S3, ρℓ)γ, ρg)
[if-false]
(ρℓ ⊎ ρg, e) ⇓ false
(((if (e) then S1 else S2); S3, ρℓ)γ, ρg)→p ((S2; S3, ρℓ)γ, ρg)
[call]
(ρℓ ⊎ ρg, e) ⇓ v p = p(n) S1
((y := p(e); S2, ρℓ)γ, ρg)→p ((S1, [n 7→ v])(y := p(e); S2, ρℓ)γ, ρg)
[return]
(ρℓ ⊎ ρg, r) ⇓ v
((return r, ρℓ)(y := p(e); S, ρ
′
ℓ)γ, ρg)→p (S, ρ
′
ℓ[y 7→ v])γ, ρg)
[top-level-call]
B = body(p) v ∈ V
([], ρg)→p ([(B, [n 7→ v])], ρg)
[top-level-return]
[(return r, ρℓ)], ρg)→p ([], ρg)
Fig. 2. A small-step operational semantics for our language, represented as a relation
σ1 →p σ2. Note that a state σi is a configuration of the form ((S, ρℓ)γ, ρg) where S
captures the statements to be executed in the current procedure, ρℓ assigns values
to local variables in the current procedure, γ is the call-stack (excluding the current
procedure), and ρg assigns values to global variables.
traces. Given a trace π = σ0 · · ·σn, we define initial(π) to be σ0, final(π) to be
σn, input(π) to be value of the input parameter in initial(π), and output(π) to
be the value of the return variable in final(π).
We define the relation  p to be {(input(π), output(π)) | π is a trace of p}.
Definition 1 (Observational Purity). A procedure p is said to be observa-
tionally pure if the relation  p is a (partial) function: that is, if for all n, r1,
r2, if n p r1 and n p r2, then r1 = r2.
Logical Formula and Invariants. Our methodology makes use of logical for-
mulae for different purposes, including to express a given invariant. Our logical
formulae use the local and global variables in the library procedure as free vari-
ables, use the same operators as allowed in our language, and make use of uni-
versal as well as existential quantification. Given a formula ϕ, we write ρ |= ϕ to
denote that ϕ evaluates to true when its free variables are assigned values from
the environment ρ.
As discussed in Section 1.2, one of our central ideas is to allow the names of
the library procedures to be referred to in the invariant; e.g., our running example
becomes amenable to our analysis using an invariant such as ‘(g = -1) ∨ (g =
lastN * factCache(lastN-1))’. We therefore allow the use of library procedure
names (in our simplified presentation, the name p) as free variables in logical
formulae. Correspondingly, we let each environment ρ map each procedure name
to a mathematical function in addition to mapping variables to numeric values,
and extend the semantics of ρ |= ϕ by substituting the values of both variables
and procedure names in ϕ from the environment ρ.
Given an environment ρ, a procedure name p, and a mathematical function
f , we will write ρ[p 7→ f ] to indicate the updated environment that maps p to
the value f and maps every other variable x to its original value ρ[x]. We will
write (ρ, f) |= ϕ to denote that ρ[p 7→ f ] |= ϕ.
Given a state σ = ((S, ρℓ)γ, ρg), we define env(σ) to be ρℓ ⊎ ρg, and given
a state σ = ([], ρg), we define env(σ) to be just ρg. We write (σ, f) |= ϕ to
denote that (env(σ), f) |= ϕ. For any execution π, we write (π, f) |= ϕ if for
every entry-state and exit-state σ in π, (σ, f) |= ϕ. We now introduce another
definition of observational purity.
Definition 2 (Observational Purity wrt an Invariant). Given an invari-
ant ϕinv , a library procedure p is said to satisfy pure(ϕinv) if there exists a func-
tion f such that for every trace π of p, output(π) = f(input(π)) and (π, f) |=
ϕinv.
It is easy to see that if procedure p satisfies pure(ϕinv) wrt any given candidate
invariant ϕinv, then p is observationally pure as per Definition 1.
4 Checking Purity Using a Theorem Prover
In this section we provide two different approaches that, given a procedure p
and a candidate invariant ϕinv, use a theorem prover to check conservatively
whether procedure p satisfies pure(ϕinv).
4.1 Verification Condition Generation
We first describe an adaptation of standard verification-condition generation
techniques that we use as a common first step in both our approaches. Given a
procedure p, a candidate invariant ϕinv, our goal is to compute a pair (ϕpost, ϕvc)
where ϕpost is a postcondition describing the state that exists after an execution
of body(p) starting from a state that satisfies ϕinv , and ϕvc is a verification-
condition that must hold true for the execution to satisfy its invariants and
assertions.
We first transform the procedure body as below to create an internal repre-
sentation that is input to the postcondition and verification condition generator.
In the internal representation, we allow the following extra forms of statements
(with their usual meaning): havoc(x), assume e, and assert e.
1. For any assignment statement “x := e” where e contains x, we introduce a
new temporary variable t and replace the assignment statement with “t :=
e; x := t”.
2. For every procedure invocation “x := p(y)”, we first ensure that y is a local
variable (by introducing a temporary if needed). We then replace the state-
ment by the code fragment “assert ϕinv; havoc(g1); ... havoc(gN);
assume ϕinv∧ x = p(y)”, where g1 to gN are the global variables.
Note that the function call has been eliminated, and replaced with an “as-
sume” expression that refers to the function symbol p. In other words, there
are no function calls in the transformed procedure.
3. We replace the “return x” statement by “assert ϕinv”.
Let TB(p, ϕinv) denote the transformed body of procedure p obtained as above.
We then compute postconditions as formally described in Fig. 3. This lets us
compute for each program point ℓ in the procedure, a condition ϕℓ that describes
what we expect to hold true when execution reaches ℓ if we start executing the
procedure in a state satisfying ϕinv and if every recursive invocation of the
procedure also terminates in a state satisfying ϕinv . We compute this using the
standard rules for the postcondition of a statement. For an assignment statement
“x := e”, we use existential quantification over x to represent the value of x prior
to the execution of the statement. If we rename these existentially quantified
variables with unique new names, we can lift all the existential quantifiers to
the outermost level. When transformed thus, the condition ϕℓ takes the form
∃x1 · · ·xn.ϕ, where ϕ is quantifier-free and x1, · · · , xn denote intermediate values
of variables along the execution path from procedure-entry to program point ℓ.
post(ϕpre, x := e) = (∃x.ϕpre) ∧ (x = e) (if x 6∈ vars(e))
post(ϕpre, havoc(x)) = ∃x.ϕpre
post(ϕpre, assume e) = ϕpre ∧ e
post(ϕpre, assert e) = ϕpre
post(ϕpre, S1; S2) = post(post(ϕ
pre, S1), S2)
post(ϕpre, if e then S1 else S2) = post(ϕ
pre ∧ e, S1) ∨ post(ϕ
pre ∧ ¬e, S2)
vc(ϕpre, assert e) = (ϕpre ⇒ e)
vc(ϕpre, S1; S2) = vc(ϕ
pre, S1) ∧ vc(post(ϕ
pre, S1), S2)
vc(ϕpre, if e then S1 else S2) = vc(ϕ
pre ∧ e, S1) ∧ vc(ϕ
pre ∧ ¬e, S2)
vc(ϕpre, S) = true(for all other S)
postvc(p, ϕinv) = (post( ϕinv,TB(p, ϕinv)),vc(ϕinv,TB(p, ϕinv)) ∧ (init(p)⇒ ϕinv))
Fig. 3. Generation of verification-condition and postcondition.
We compute a verification condition ϕvc that represents the conditions we
must check to ensure that an execution through the procedure satisfies its obli-
gations: namely, that the invariant holds true at every call-site and at procedure-
exit. Let ℓ denote a call-site or the procedure-exit. We need to check that
ϕℓ ⇒ ϕ
inv holds. Thus, the generation verification condition essentially con-
sists of the conjunction of this check over all call-sites and procedure-exit.
Finally, the function postvc computes the postcondition and verification
condition for the entire procedure as shown in Fig. 3. Note that this adds the
check that the initial state too must satisfy ϕinv as the basis condition for induc-
tion. init(p) is basically the formula “g1 = c1 ∧ . . . gN = cN” (see Section 2).
Example We now illustrate the postcondition and verification condition gener-
ated from our factorial example presented in Listing 1.1. Listing 1.2 shows the
example expressed in our language and transformed as described earlier (using
function TB), using a supplied candidate invariant ϕinv.
Fig. 4 illustrates the computation of postcondition and verification condi-
tion from this transformed example. In this figure, we use ϕprecs to denote the
precondition computed to hold just before the recursive callsite, and ϕpostcs to
denote the postcondition computed to hold just after the recursive callsite. The
postcondition ϕpost (at the end of the procedure body) is itself a disjunction of
three path-conditions representing execution through the three different paths
in the program. In this illustration, we have simplified the logical conditions
by omitting useless existential quantifications (that is, any quantification of the
form ∃x.ψ where x does not occur in ψ). Note that the existentially quantified
g and lastN in ϕpostcs denote the values of these globals before the recursive call.
Similarly, the existentially quantified g and lastN in ϕpath3 denote the values of
these globals when the recursive call terminates, while the free variables g and
lastN denote the final values of these globals.
1 g := −1;
2 l a stN := 0 ;
3 factCache (n) {
4 i f (n <= 1) {
5 r e s u l t := 1 ;
6 } else i f ( g != −1 && n == lastN ) {
7 r e s u l t := g ;
8 } else {
9 t1 := n−1;
10 // t2 := factCache ( t1 ) ;
11 a s s e r t ϕinv ;
12 havoc ( g ) ; havoc ( lastN ) ;
13 assume ϕinv∧ ( t2 = factCache ( t1 ) ) ;
14 g := n ∗ t2 ;
15 l a stN := n ;
16 r e s u l t := g ;
17 }
18 // return r e su l t ;
19 a s s e r t ϕinv ;
20 }
Listing 1.2. Procedure factCache from Listing 1.1 transformed to incorporate a
supplied candidate invariant ϕinv.
init(p) = (g = -1) ∧ (lastN = 0)
ϕ
path
1
= ϕinv ∧ (n <= 1) ∧ (result = 1)
ϕ
path
2
= ϕinv ∧ ¬(n <= 1) ∧ (g != 1) ∧ (n = lastN) ∧ (result = g)
ϕ
pre
cs = ϕ
inv ∧ ¬(n <= 1) ∧ ¬((n = lastN) ∧ (result = g)) ∧ (t1 = n-1)
ϕ
post
cs = (∃g∃lastN ϕ
pre
cs ) ∧ ϕ
inv ∧ (t2 = factCache (t1))
ϕ
path
3
= (∃g∃lastN ϕpostcs ) ∧ (g = n * t2) ∧ (last N = n) ∧ (result = g)
ϕ
post = ϕpath
1
∨ ϕpath
2
∨ ϕpath
3
ϕ
vc = (ϕprecs ⇒ ϕ
inv) ∧ (ϕpost ⇒ ϕinv) ∧ (init(p)⇒ ϕinv)
Fig. 4. The different formulae computed from the procedure in Listing 1.2 by our
postcondition and verification-condition computation.
4.2 Approach 1: Existential Approach
Let p be a procedure with input parameter n and return variable r. Let
postvc(p, ϕinv) = (ϕpost, ϕvc). Let ψe denote the formula ϕvc ∧ (ϕpost ⇒ (r =
p(n))). Let x denote the sequence of all free variables in ψe except for p. We
define ea(p, ϕinv) to be the formula ∀x.ψe.
In this approach, we use a theorem prover to check whether ea(p, ϕinv)
is satisfiable. As shown by the following theorem, satisfiability of ea(p, ϕinv)
establishes that p satisfies pure(ϕinv).
Theorem 1. A procedure p satisfies pure(ϕinv) if ∃p.ea(p, ϕinv) is a tautology
(which holds iff ea(p, ϕinv) is satisfiable).
Proof. Note that p is the only free variable in ea(p, ϕinv). Assume that [p 7→ f ]
is a satisfying assignment for ea(p, ϕinv). We prove that for every trace π the
following hold: (a) output(π) = f(input(π)) and (b) If (initial(π), f) satisfies
ϕinv, then (final(π), f) also satisfies ϕinv.
The proof is by contradiction. Let π be the shortest trace that does not
satisfy at least one of the two conditions (a) and (b).
Let us first consider a trace π without any sub-traces (i.e., without a pro-
cedure call). Consider any transition σi →p σi+1 in π caused by an assignment
statement S. Our verification-condition generation produces a precondition ϕpre
S
and a postcondition ϕpost
S
for S. Further, this generation guarantees that if (σi, f)
satisfies ϕpre
S
, then (σi+1, f) satisfies ϕ
post
S
. This lets us prove (via induction over
i), that if (initial(π), f) satisfies ϕinv , then (σi+1, f) satisfies ϕ
post
S
.
We now consider a trace π that contains a sub-trace π′ = σi · · ·σj corre-
sponding to a procedure call statement S. Our verification-condition generation
produces a precondition ϕpre
S
, a postcondition ϕpost
S
and a conjunct ϕpre
S
⇒ ϕinv
in ϕvc for S. We extend the induction over i to handle recursive calls as be-
low. Our inductive hypothesis guarantees that (σi, f) satisfies ϕ
pre
S
. Further, we
know that [p 7→ f ] is a satisfying assignment for ea(p, ϕinv), which includes the
conjunct ϕpre
S
⇒ ϕinv. Hence, it follows that (σi, f) satisfies ϕ
inv. Since π′ is a
shorter trace than π, we can assume that it satisfies conditions (a) and (b). This
is sufficient to guarantee that (σj , f) satisfies ϕ
post
S
.
Thus, we can establish (final(π), f) satisfies ϕpost and ϕinv. Further, since
ea(p, ϕinv) includes the conjunct ϕpost ⇒ (r = p(n)), it follows that output(π) =
f(input(π)).
4.3 Approach 2: Impurity Witness Approach
The existential approach presented in the previous section has a drawback.
Checking satisfiability of ea(p, ϕinv) is hard because it contains universal quan-
tifiers and existing theorem provers do not work well enough for this approach.
We now present an approximation of the existential approach that is easier to use
with existing theorem provers. This new approach, which we will refer to as the
impurity witness approach, reduces the problem to that of checking whether a
quantifier-free formula is unsatisfiable, which is better suited to the capabilities
of state-of-the-art theorem provers. This approach focuses on finding a coun-
terexample to show that the procedure is impure or it violates the candidate
invariant.
Let p be a procedure with input parameter n and return variable r. Let
postvc(p, ϕinv) = (ϕpost, ϕvc). Let ϕpostα denote the formula obtained by replac-
ing every free variable x other than p in ϕpost by a new free variable xα. Define
ϕ
post
β similarly. Define iw(p, ϕ
inv) to be the formula (¬ϕvc)∨(ϕpostα ∧ϕ
post
β ∧(nα =
nβ) ∧ (rα 6= rβ)).
The impurity witness approach checks whether iw(p, ϕinv) is satisfiable. This
can be done by separately checking whether ¬ϕvc is satisfiable and whether
(ϕpostα ∧ϕ
post
β ∧(nα = nβ)∧(rα 6= rβ)) is satisfiable. As formally defined, ϕ
vc and
ϕpost contain embedded existential quantifications. As explained earlier, these
existential quantifiers can be moved to the outside after variable renaming and
can be omitted for a satisfiability check. (A formula of the form ∃x.ψ is satisfiable
iff ψ is satisfiable.) As usual, these existential quantifiers refer to intermediate
values of variables along an execution path. Finding a satisfying assignment to
these variables essentially identifies a possible execution path (that satisfies some
other property).
Theorem 2. A procedure p satisfies pure(ϕinv) if iw(p, ϕinv) is unsatisfiable.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive.
We say that a pair of feasible executions (π1, π2) is an impurity witness if
there is a trace πa in π1 and a trace πb in π2 such that πa and πb have the same
input value but different return values. Otherwise, we say that (π1, π2) is pure.
We extend this notion and say that a single execution π is pure if (π, π) is pure.
We say that a function f is compatible with a set of executions Π if for every
trace π ∈ Π , output(π) = f(input(π)).
We say that a pure feasible execution π is a ϕinv-violation witness if there
is some function f that is compatible with {π} such that (π, f) 2 ϕinv. Other-
wise, we say that π satisfies the invariant. Note that this definition introduces a
conservative approximation as we explain later.
We will consider minimal witnesses of the following form. We say that an
impurity witness (π1, π2) is minimal if for every proper prefix π
′
1 of π1 and every
proper prefix π′2 of π2, the following hold: (a) (π
′
1, π2) is pure, (b) (π1, π
′
2) is
pure, (c) π′1 satisfies the invariant, and (d) π
′
2 satisfies the invariant.
We say that an ϕinv-violation witness π is minimal if no proper prefix π′ of
π is a ϕinv-violation witness.
If p does not satisfy pure(ϕinv), then there exists a minimal impurity witness
or a minimal ϕinv-violation witness. Note that our definition of ϕinv-violation
witness is a conservative approximation and the converse of the preceding claim
does not hold. A ϕinv-violation witness does not mean that p does not satisfy
pure(ϕinv).
In the first case, (ϕpostα ∧ ϕ
post
β ∧ (nα = nβ) ∧ (rα 6= rβ)) must be satisfiable
(as we show below). In the second case, ¬ϕvc must be satisfiable (as we show
below). Thus, iw(p, ϕinv) is satisfiable in either case. The theorem follows.
We establish the above result as below. If we have a trace that satisfies the
invariant and the set of its sub-traces are pure, then the valuations assigned to
variables by the trace satisfies ϕpost. Thus, if (π1, π2) are a minimal impurity
witness, let πa and πb be the two traces in π1 and π2 that are incompatible. We
can assign values to variables in ϕpostα from πa, and assign values to variables in
ϕ
post
β from πb to get a satisfying assignment for (ϕ
post
α ∧ϕ
post
β ∧(nα = nβ)∧(rα 6=
rβ)).
If π is a minimal ϕinv-violation witness, let π′ be the trace that contains the
invariant violation. Assigning values to variables as in π′ produces a satisfying
assignment for ¬ϕvc.
5 Generating the Invariant
We now describe a simple but reasonably effective semi-algorithm for generating
a candidate invariant automatically from the given procedure. Our approach
of Section 4 can be used with a manually provided invariant or the candidate
invariant generated by this semi-algorithm (whenever it terminates).
The invariant-generation approach is iterative and computes a sequence of
progressively weaker candidate invariants I0, I1, · · · and terminates if and when
Im ≡ Im+1, at which point Im is returned as the candidate invariant. The
initial candidate invariant I0 captures the initial values of the global variable. In
iteration k, we apply a procedure similar to the one described in Section 4 and
compute the strongest conditions that hold true at every program point if the
execution of the procedure starts in a state satisfying Ik−1 and if every recursive
invocation terminates in a state satisfying Ik−1. We then take the disjunction
of the conditions computed at the points before the recursive call-sites and at
the end of the procedure, and existentially quantify all local variables. We refer
to the resulting formula as Next(Ik−1,TB(p, Ik−1)). We take the disjunction of
this formula with Ik−1 and simplify it to get Ik.
In the following formalization of this semi-algorithm, we exploit the fact that
the assert statements are added precisely at every recursive callsite and end of
procedure and these are the places where we take the conditions to be disjuncted.
I0 = init(p)
Ik = Simplify(Ik−1 ∨Next(Ik−1,TB(p, Ik−1)))
Next(ϕpre, assert e) = ∃ℓ1 · · · ℓmϕ
pre(where ℓ1, · · · , ℓm are local variables in ϕ
pre)
Next(ϕpre, S1; S2) = Next(ϕ
pre, S1) ∨Next(post(ϕ
pre, S1), S2)
Next(ϕpre, if e then S1 else S2) = Next(ϕ
pre ∧ e, S1) ∨Next(ϕ
pre ∧ ¬e, S2)
Next(ϕpre, S) = false(for all other S)
Fig. 5. Iterative computation of invariant.
In our running example, I0 is‘g = -1 ∧ lastN = 0’. Applying Next to I0 yields
I0 itself as the pre-condition at the point just before the recursive call-site, and
‘(g = -1 ∧ lastN = 0) ∨ g = lastN * p(lastN-1)’ (after certain simplifications) as
the pre-condition at the end of the procedure. Therefore, I1 is ‘(g = -1 ∧ lastN
= 0) ∨ g = lastN * p(lastN-1)’. When we apply Next to I1, the computed pre-
conditions are I1 itself at both the program points mentioned above. Therefore,
the approach terminates with I1 as the candidate invariant.
6 Evaluation
We have implemented our OP checking approach as a prototype using the Boogie
framework [4], and have evaluated the approach using this implementation on
several examples. The objective of this evaluation was primarily a sanity check,
to test how our approach does on a set of OP as well as non-OP procedures.
We tried several simple non-OP programs, and our implementation termi-
nated with a “no” answer on all of them. We also tried the approach on several
OP procedures: (1) the ‘factCache’ running example, (2) a version of a factorial
procedure that caches all arguments seen so far and their corresponding return
values in an array, (3) a version of factorial that caches only the return value for
argument value 19 in a scalar variable, (4) a recursive procedure that returns
the nth Fibonacci number and caches all its arguments and corresponding return
values seen so far in an array, and (5) a “matrix chain multiplication” (MCM)
procedure. The last example is based on dynamic programming, and hence nat-
urally uses a table to memoize results for sub-problems. Here, observational
purity implies that the procedure always returns the same solution for a given
sub-problem, whether a hit was found in the table or not. The appendix of a
technical report associated with this paper depicts all the procedures mentioned
above as created by us directly in Boogie’s language, as well as the invariants
that we supplied manually (in SMT2 format).
It is notable that our “existential approach” causes the theorem prover to not
scale to even simple examples. The “impurity witness” approach terminated on
all the examples mentioned above with a “yes” answer, with the theorem prover
taking less than 1 second on each example.
7 Related Work
The previous work that is most closely related to our work is by Barnett et
al. [1,2]. Their approach is based on the same notion of observational purity as
our approach. Their approach is structurally similar to ours, in terms of needing
an invariant, and using an inductive check for both the validity of the invariant
as well as the uniqueness of return values for a given argument. However, their
approach is based on a more complex notion of invariant than our approach,
which relates pairs of global states, and does not use a function symbol to repre-
sent recursive calls within the procedure. Hence, their approach does not extend
readily to recursive procedures; they in fact state that “there is a circularity -
it would take a delicate argument, and additional conditions, to avoid unsound-
ness in this case”. Our idea of allowing the function symbol in the invariant to
represent the recursive call allows recursive procedures to be checked, and also
simplifies the specification of the invariant in many cases.
Cok et al. [5] generalize the work of Barnett et al.’s work, and suggest classify-
ing procedures into categories “pure”, “secret”, and “query”. The “query” proc-
dures are observationally pure. Again, recursive procedures are not addressed.
Naumann [3] proposes a notion of observational purity that is also the same
as ours. Their paper gives a rigorous but manual methodology for proving the
observational purity of a given procedure. Their methodology is not similar to
ours; rather, it is based finding a weakly pure procedure that simulates the given
procedure as far as externally visible state changes and the return value are
concerned. They have no notion of an invariant that uses a function symbol
that represents the procedure, and they don’t explicitly address the checking of
recursive procedures.
There exists a significant body of work on identifying differences between two
similar procedures. For instance, differential assertion checking [6] is a represen-
tative from this body, and is for checking if two procedures can ever start from
the same state but end in different states such that exactly one of the ending
states fails a given assertion. Their approach is based on logical reasoning, and
accommodates recursive procedures. Our impurity witness approach has some
similarity with their approach, because it is based on comparing the given pro-
cedure with itself. However, our comparison is stricter, because in our setting,
starting with a common argument value but from different global states that
are both within the invariant should not cause a difference in the return value.
Furthermore, technically our approach is different because we use an invariant
that refers to a function symbol that represents the procedure being checked,
which is not a feature of their invariants. Partush et al. [7] solve a similar prob-
lem as differential assertion checking, but using abstract interpretation instead
of logical reasoning.
There is a substantial body of work on checking if a procedure is pure, in
the sense that it does not modify any objects that existed before the procedure
was invoked, and does not modify any global variables. Salcianu et al. [8] de-
scribe a static analysis to check purity. Various tools exist, such as JML [9] and
Spec# [10], that use logical techniques based on annotations to prove procedures
as pure. Purity is a more restrictive notion than observational purity; procedures
such as our ‘factCache’ example are observationally pure, but not pure because
they use as well as update state that persists between calls to the procedure.
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Appendix A Proofs
Lemma 1. If there exists no impurity witness (π1, π2) and there exists no ϕ
inv-
violation witness π, then p satisfies pure(ϕinv).
Proof. Consider the set Π of all feasible executions of p. If there exists no im-
purity witness, then there exists a function f compatible with Π . (We take the
partial function {(input(π), output(π)) | π ∈ Π} and extend it to be a total func-
tion.) Further, since there exists no ϕinv-violation witness, we are guaranteed
that (π, f) |= ϕinv for every π ∈ Π .
Lemma 2. If there exists a ϕinv-violation witness π, then there exists a minimal
ϕinv-violation witness.
Lemma 3. If there exists an impurity witness, then there exists a minimal im-
purity witness or a minimal ϕinv-violation witness.
Appendix B Examples
B.1 Factorial, caching single result
Invariant:
(or (= nineteen (- 0 1)) (= nineteen (* (FactSingle 18) 19)))
1 var n ine t een : int ;
2 /∗ i n va r i an t : n ineteen = −1 | |
3 nineteen = 19∗ FactS ing l e (18) ∗/
4 procedure { : en t rypo in t } FactS ing l e (n : int ) r e tu rn s ( r :
int ) mod i f i e s n ine t een ;{
5 i f ( n <= 1) { r := 1 ;}
6 else {
7 i f ( n == 19) {
8 i f ( n ine t een == −1) {
9 c a l l n in e t een := FactS ing l e (18) ;
10 n ine t een := n ine t een ∗ 19 ;
11 r := n ine t een ;
12 } else {
13 r := n ine t een ;
14 }
15 } else {
16 c a l l r := FactS ing l e ( n − 1) ;
17 r := n ∗ r ;
18 }
19 }
20 }
Listing 1.3. Returns factorial of ‘n’, and memoizes result for argument value ‘19’ in
global variable ‘nineteen’.
B.2 Factorial, caching in array
Invariant:
(forall ((k Int) ) (or (= (select g k) 0) (= (*
k (FactArray (- k 1))) (select g k))))
1 var g : [ int ] int ;
2 /∗ i n va r i an t : f o r a l l k . g [ k ] = 0 | |
3 g [ k ] = k∗FactArray ( k−1) ∗/
4 procedure { : en t rypo in t } FactArray (n : int ) r e tu rn s ( r : int
) mod i f i e s g ;{
5 var k : int ;
6 i f ( n <= 1) { r := 1 ;}
7 else {
8 i f ( g [ n ] == 0) {
9 c a l l k := FactArray (n − 1) ;
10 g [ n ] := k ∗ n ;
11 }
12 r := g [ n ] ;
13 }
14 }
Listing 1.4. Returns factorial of ‘n’, and caches results for all argument values greater
than 1 in global array ‘g’
B.3 Factorial, caching only last-seen argument
Invariant:
(or (= g (- 0 1)) (= g (* (FactRecent (+ (- 0 1) lastN)) lastN)))
1 var lastN : int ;
2 var g : int ;
3 // i n va r i an t : g = −1 | | g = las tN ∗ FactRecent ( l a s tN − 1)
4 procedure { : en t rypo in t } FactRecent (n : int ) r e tu rn s ( r :
int ) mod i f i e s lastN , g ;{
5 i f ( n <= 1) { r := 1 ;}
6 else {
7 i f ( n == lastN && g != −1) {
8 r := g ;
9 } else {
10 c a l l r := FactRecent ( n − 1) ;
11 r := n ∗ r ;
12 lastN := a ;
13 g := r ;
14 }
15 }
16 }
Listing 1.5. Returns factorial of ‘n’, and caches last seen argument in lastN and
corresponding return value in g
B.4 Fibonacci, caching in array
Invariant:
(forall (k Int) (or (= (select cache k) 0) (= (+ (fib (- k 1)) (fib (- k 2)))
(select cache k))))
1 /∗ i n va r i an t : f o r a l l k . cache [ k ] = 0 OR cache [ k ] = f i b ( k
−1) + f i b ( k −2) ∗/
2 var cache : [ int ] int ;
3 procedure { : en t rypo in t } f i b (n : int ) r e tu rn s ( r : int )
mod i f i e s cache ;{
4 var a , b : int ;
5 i f ( n <= 2) {
6 r := 1 ;
7 } else {
8 i f ( cache [ n ] != 0) {
9 r := cache [ n ] ;
10 } else {
11 c a l l a := f i b (n −1) ;
12 c a l l b := f i b (n −2) ;
13 r := a + b ;
14 cache [ n ] := r ;
15 }
16 }
17 }
Listing 1.6. Returns nth Fibonacci number, and caches all arguments and return
values seen so far in global array ‘cache’
B.5 Matrix Chain Multiplication
Invariant:
(forall ((i Int) (j Int)) (or (= (select m i j) (- 0 1))
(= (chooseSplit i j i (- 0 1)) (select m i j))))
1 var p : [ int ] int ;
2 var m: [ int , int ] int ;
3 /∗ i n va r i an t : f o r a l l i , j . m[ i , j ] = −1 OR m[ i , j ] =
choo s eSp l i t ( i , j , i , −1) ∗/
4 procedure { : en t rypo in t } mcm( i : int , j : int ) r e tu rn s ( r :
int ) mod i f i e s m;{
5 var k , q : int ;
6 var a , b : int ;
7 i f ( i == j ) {
8 m[ i , j ] := 0 ;
9 r := 0 ;
10 } else {
11 i f ( m[ i , j ] > 0) {
12 r := m[ i , j ] ;
13 } else {
14 k := i ;
15 c a l l r := choo s eSp l i t ( i , j , k , m[
i , j ] ) ;
16 m[ i , j ] := r ;
17 }
18 }
19 }
20
21 procedure choo s eSp l i t ( i : int , j : int , k : int , min : int )
r e tu rn s ( r : int ) mod i f i e s m;{
22 var a , b , q : int ;
23 var min1 : int ;
24 i f ( k >= j ) {
25 r := min ;
26 } else {
27 c a l l a := mcm( i , k ) ;
28 c a l l b := mcm(k+1, j ) ;
29 q := a + b + p [ i −1] ∗ p [ k ] ∗ p [ j ] ;
30 i f ( q < min) {
31 min1 := q ;
32 } else {
33 min1 := min ;
34 }
35 c a l l r := choo s eSp l i t ( i , j , k + 1 , min1 ) ;
36 }
37 }
Listing 1.7. Returns the minimum number of multipications needed to multiply a
sequence of matrices.
Notes about how this program was verified. In this example, ‘p’ is an input
array, and stores the dimensions of the matrices to be multiplied. p[i] and p[i+1]
store the dimensions of the ith matrix to be multiplied. Table ‘m’ is computed
by the procedure. m[i, j] stores the minimum number of scalar multiplications
required to multiply the sequence of matrices from the ith matrix through the
jth matrix. The procedure ‘mcm’ basically returns m[i,j] given arguments i and
j. chooseSplit is a tail-recursive procedure, which is used to consider all possible
k, i < k ≤ j, at which to split the sequence i, i+1, . . . , j. This search is required
to find the optimal split point.
Note, mcm and chooseSplit call each other. Although we presented our ap-
proach as if it can check a given single procedure, it can also check if a set
of mutually-recursive procedures are all OP. The idea is that each procedure
needs an invariant, and this invariant can use function symbols to refer to all
procedures called by this procedure. Each procedure can then be checked inde-
pendently using our approach as-is. Intuitively, this works because we check all
the procedures, and while checking any procedure we assume as an inductive
hypothesis that the other procedures are OP.
The invariant shown in the example above is for procedure ‘mcm’. We ap-
plied our tool only on procedure mcm. We did not apply our tool on procedure
‘chooseSplit’, because currently our tool is not set up to analyze all procedures
in a multi-procedure program. However, it is obvious that the impurity witness
approach would certify procedure chooseSplit as OP, even without any invariant.
This is because this procedure does not refer to or update the mutable global
variable ‘m’. Therefore, for any tuple of argument values, the procedure would
always follow the same path no matter how many times this tuple is repeated.
Therefore, if the calls encountered in this path are assumed to be to observa-
tionally pure procedures (inductive hypothesis), then the path must return the
same value every time.
